Abstract. In this paper we examine the notion of plaintext awareness as it applies to hybrid encryption schemes. We apply this theory to the Cramer-Shoup hybrid scheme acting on fixed length messages and deduce that the Cramer-Shoup scheme is plaintext-aware in the standard model. This answers a previously open conjecture of Bellare and Palacio on the existence of fully plaintext-aware encryption schemes.
Introduction
Plaintext awareness is a simple concept with a difficult explanation. An encryption scheme is plaintext aware if it is practically impossible for any entity to produce a ciphertext without knowing the associated message. This effectively renders a decryption oracle useless to an attacker, as any ciphertext submitted for decryption must either be invalid or the attacker must already know the decryption of that ciphertext and so does not gain any information by querying the oracle. Thus a scheme that is plaintext aware and semantically secure should be secure against adaptive attacks.
There are two problems with this simplistic approach. Firstly, if we wish to achieve the IND-CCA2 definition of security for an encryption scheme, then we have to be careful about how we define plaintext awareness, because, in this model, the attacker is always given one ciphertext for which he does not know the corresponding decryption (the challenge ciphertext). It is usually comparatively simple to achieve plaintext awareness when you do not have to consider the attacker as able to get hold of ciphertexts for which he does not know the corresponding decryption. We will follow the notation of Bellare and Palacio [4] and term this PA1 plaintext-awareness. A scheme that is IND-CPA and PA1 plaintext aware is only IND-CCA1 secure [4] . It is a lot harder to prove plaintext-awareness in full generality, when the attacker has access to an oracle that will return ciphertexts for which the attacker does not know the corresponding decryption, especially if the attacker has some measure of control over the probability distribution that the oracle uses to select the messages that it encrypts. This is termed PA2 plaintext awareness.
The second problem is that it is difficult to formally define plaintext awareness. The obvious way to define it is to say that for every attacker A that outputs a challenge ciphertext C, there exists a plaintext extractor A * for A that outputs the decryption of C when given C as input. However, any encryption scheme that satisfies this definition of plaintext awareness in the standard model must necessarily fail to be IND-CPA secure. Hence, such a definition is not useful. For a satisfactory definition of plaintext awareness to be proposed, it is imperative that the plaintext extractor A * be given some extra information about the actions that the attacker A took in order to compute the challenge ciphertext.
The original definition of plaintext awareness [2] was only given in the random oracle model and the plaintext extractor was given access to the oracle queries that the attacker made when constructing ciphertexts. This definition works well, but can only prove the security of a scheme in the random oracle model. Recently, a definition of plaintext awareness has been given in the standard model [4] , where the plaintext extractor is also given access to the random coins that the attacker used in constructing the challenge ciphertext; thus the plaintext extractor can examine every action that the attacker took in its execution. Unfortunately, Bellare and Palacio were unable to prove that any scheme met their strongest (PA2) definition of plaintext awareness, although they suggested that the Cramer-Shoup scheme [5] was a very likely candidate.
This paper proves that the Cramer-Shoup scheme is plaintext aware in the standard model, thus proving the conjecture of Bellare and Palacio. The proof uses two new techniques: encryption simulation and PA1+ plaintext awareness. An encryption scheme that is simulatable is necessarily IND-CCA2 secure, and so the concept has limited use. However, the concept of PA1+ plaintext awareness may have further scope. The proof is obtained under several computational assumptions, including the controversial Diffie-Hellman Knowledge (DHK) assumption. We also assume the existence of groups on which the DDH problem is hard and the existence of suitably secure hash functions.
Preliminaries

Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
We briefly recap the notion of an asymmetric cipher and of a KEM-DEM hybrid cipher [5] . We will assume that the reader is familiar with the general theory of hybrid ciphers and will concentrate on introducing notation that will be used in this paper. An asymmetric encryption scheme is a triple of algorithms:
1. A probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm, G, which takes as input a security parameter 1 k and outputs a public/private key pair (pk, sk). The public key defines the message space M, which is the set of all possible messages that can be submitted to the encryption algorithm, and the ciphertext space C, which is the set of all possible ciphertexts that can be submitted to the decryption algorithm (and may be larger than the range of the encryption algorithm). 2. A (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm, E, which takes as input a message m ∈ M and a public key pk, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C. We will denote this as C = E(pk, m).
3. A deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm, D, which takes as input a ciphertext C ∈ C and a secret key sk, and outputs either a message m ∈ M or the error symbol ⊥. We denote this as m = D(sk, C).
The accepted notion of security for an asymmetric encryption scheme is assessed via the following game played between a two-stage attacker A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a hypothetical challenger: The attacker wins the game if b = b . The attacker's advantage is defined to be: For more information on the basic security models for an asymmetric encryption scheme, the reader is referred to [2] .
A hybrid cipher is an asymmetric cipher which uses a keyed symmetric algorithm, such as an encryption algorithm or a MAC, as a subroutine. Most hybrid ciphers can be presented as the combination of an asymmetric key encapsulation method (KEM) and a symmetric data encapsulation method (DEM). A KEM is a triple of algorithms consisting of: 1. A probabilistic, polynomial-time key generation algorithm, Gen, which takes as input a security parameter 1 k and outputs a public/private key pair (pk, sk). 2. A probabilistic, polynomial-time encapsulation algorithm, Encap, which takes as input a public key pk, and outputs a key K and an encapsulation of that key C. We denote this as (C, K) = Encap(pk). 3. A deterministic, polynomial-time decapsulation algorithm, Decap, which takes as inputs the private key sk and an encapsulation C, and outputs a symmetric key K or the error symbol ⊥. We denote this as K = Decap(sk, C).
1. A deterministic, polynomial-time encryption algorithm, Enc, which takes as input a message m ∈ {0, 1} * of any length and a symmetric key K of some pre-determined length. It outputs an encryption C = Enc K (m). 2. A deterministic, polynomial-time decryption algorithm, Dec, which takes as input an encryption C ∈ {0, 1} * and a symmetric key K of some predetermined length, and outputs either a message m ∈ {0, 1} * or the error symbol ⊥.
A KEM and a DEM can be composed in the obvious way in create a hybrid encryption algorithm. The greatest advantage of designing a hybrid encryption scheme in terms of KEMs and DEMs is that Cramer and Shoup [5] were able to propose independent security criteria for the KEM and the DEM that guarantee that a secure KEM and a secure DEM combine to give a secure (IND-CCA2) encryption scheme. However, since our focus is on plaintext awareness, we will not need to discuss these security notions here.
Plaintext Awareness
We use the notions and notations given by Bellare and Palacio [4] . The notion of plaintext awareness in the standard model states that an encryption scheme (G, E, D) is plaintext aware in the standard model if, for all ciphertext creators (attackers) A, there exists a plaintext extractor A * which takes as input the random coins of A and can answer the decryption queries of A in a manner that A cannot distinguish from a real decryption oracle. In order that A can be given access to ciphertexts for which it does not know the corresponding decryption, A will be allowed to query a plaintext creation oracle P with some query information aux . The plaintext creation oracle will pick a message at random (possibly from a distribution partially defined by aux ) and returns the encryption of that message to the attacker 1 . Note that both A * and P retain their state and their ability to access the same random tape between invocations.
We will assume that all the algorithms described are polynomial-time, probabilistic, state-based Turing machines, and that the random coins of the Turing machine A are denoted R [A] . Plaintext awareness is formally defined using two games. First we define the REAL game:
1. The challenger generates a random key pair (pk, sk) = G(1 k ) and creates an empty list of ciphertexts CList. 2. The attacker executes A on pk.
-If the attacker queries the encryption oracle with query information aux , then the challenger generates a random message m = P(aux ) and computes its encryption C = E(pk, m). It adds C to CList and returns C to the attacker.
-If the attacker queries the decryption oracle with a ciphertext C, then the decryption oracle returns D(sk, C). The attacker may not query the decryption oracle with any ciphertext appearing on CList. The attacker terminates by outputting a bitstring x.
The FAKE game is defined as:
-If the attacker queries the encryption oracle with query information aux , then the challenger generates a random message m = P(aux ) and computes its encryption C = E(pk, m). It adds C to CList and returns C to the attacker. 
is negligible as a function of the security parameter.
Simulatable Encryption Schemes
The aim of this paper is to show that the Cramer-Shoup scheme is plaintextaware. In order to do this we take advantage of a very useful property that it possess: when instantiated with a suitable DEM, no attacker can distinguish valid ciphertexts from completely random bit strings. By this we mean that there exists a function f , which is in some sense invertible, that takes random bits as input and outputs bit strings that look like ciphertexts to an attacker. These bit strings are very unlikely to actually be valid ciphertexts (as we believe that the Cramer-Shoup scheme is plaintext aware) but no attacker can distinguish them from valid ciphertexts. We call this encryption simulation. For a simulatable encryption scheme, an attacker's ability to get hold of new ciphertexts in the PA2 model is roughly equivalent to an ability to get hold of blocks of random data. A scheme that remains plaintext-aware even when the attacker can get hold new fixed-length random strings on demand is said to be PA1+ plaintext aware. This notion is stronger than PA1, but conceptually weaker than PA2 plaintext awareness. In this section we will formally define simulation and PA1+ plaintext awareness, and show that any scheme that is both PA1+ and simulatable is PA2.
Simulatable Encryption
We will wish to work with encryption schemes that are simulatable, by which we mean that there exists a Turing machine f which take a string of random bits as input and produces an output that cannot be distinguished from real ciphertexts. The difference between f and the real encryption function is that f must be in some sense invertible. We envisage f taking long strings of random bits as input and producing a shorter output, and so we insist on the existence of a Turing machine f −1 which acts as a perfect inverse for f when used on the right, i.e.
However, since f −1 cannot act as a perfect inverse for f when used on the left, we merely require that f −1 (f (r)) looks like a randomly generated bit string, i.e. it is computationally infeasible to tell the difference between a random string r of the appropriate length and f −1 (f (r)). Hence, f −1 must be a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine; while, for technical reasons, f must be a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine. 
Definition 3 (Simulatable Encryption Scheme
-f (f −1 (C)) = C for all C ∈ C. -
The attacker wins if b = b and its advantage is defined in the usual way.
At this stage, and for technical reasons that will become apparent in the next section, we will restrict ourselves to encryption schemes that have fixed-length ciphertext spaces, i.e. the ciphertext space C = {0, 1} n for some n. Normally, the simplest way of producing a cipher with fixed-length ciphertexts is to restrict the message space to fixed-length messages.
Theorem 1. If (G, E, D) is a simulatable encryption scheme then it is IND-CCA2 secure.
Sketch Proof Let A be an IND-CCA2 attacker for the scheme, and let Game 1 be the game in which A interacts with the IND-CCA2 game properly. Let Game 2 be similar to Game 1 except that the challenge ciphertext is computed by applying f to a randomly generated string r ∈ {0, 1} l , rather than using the proper encryption algorithm. Let W i be the event that A wins Game i.
Consider the following algorithm B against the simulatability of the encryption scheme:
1. The challenger generates a key pair (pk, sk) = G ( 
However,
| is negligible, as the encryption algorithm is simulatable. In Game 2, though, the challenge ciphertext is completely independent of the messages supplied by the attacker. Therefore, P r[
Therefore, in some sense, the notion of encryption simulation is less useful than one might hope. It should be easier to prove that a scheme is IND-CCA2 secure, than to show that it is simulatable; and if we can show that a scheme is simulatable, then there is no need to consider whether it is plaintext aware, as we have already shown that it is IND-CCA2. However, since our goal in this paper is to show that PA2 schemes can exist, this notion will prove useful.
PA1+ Plaintext Awareness
For a simulatable encryption algorithm, a ciphertext creator's ability to get hold of new, randomly generated ciphertexts C (that are the encryption of messages drawn from some distribution) is roughly equivalent to being able to get hold of randomly generated strings r = f −1 (C) ∈ {0, 1} l . We define the PA1+ model as the extension of the PA1 model in which a ciphertext creator has access to an oracle which provides it with randomly generated bit strings of length l, and show that, for a simulatable encryption algorithm, this is enough to imply that the scheme is PA2 plaintext-aware.
We define the PA1+ model using the REAL and FAKE games as before. For an attacker A the REAL game works as follows:
1. The challenger generates a random key pair (pk, sk) = G(1 k ). 2. The attacker executes A on pk. The attacker has access to a decryption oracle and to a randomness oracle.
-If the attacker queries the randomness oracle, then the challenger generates a random strong r ∈ {0, 1} l , and returns r to the attacker. The FAKE game is defined in the obvious way:
1. The challenger generates a random key pair (pk, sk) = G(1 k ) and creates an (empty) list RList of the random blocks that the attacker has been given. 2. The attacker executes A on pk. The attacker has access to a decryption oracle and to a randomness oracle.
-If the attacker queries the randomness oracle, then the challenger generates a random strong r ∈ {0, 1} l , adds r to RList and returns r to the attacker.
-If the attacker queries the decryption oracle with a ciphertext C, then the decryption oracle returns A * (C, pk, R[A], RList). The attacker terminates by outputting a bitstring x. 
Definition 4 (PA1+ Plaintext Awareness
that Dist has in distinguishing whether A interacts with the REAL game or the FAKE game is negligible as a function of the security parameter.
Intuitively, the difference between PA1 and PA1+ is in the ability for the ciphertext creator to act in a manner that is unpredictable by the plaintext extractor after the plaintext extractor has returned a message. For a scheme that is PA1, the plaintext extractor, when attempting to provide some sort of decryption of a ciphertext, knows exactly what the ciphertext creator is going to do with the ciphertext (as it has access to the ciphertext creator's random tape). Hence, the plaintext creator can tailor its response to make sure that that particular execution of the ciphertext creator cannot differentiate between the plaintext extractor's response and the response of a real decryption oracle. However, a PA1+ ciphertext creator has the ability to acquire random bits that could affect its execution after it has received the plaintext extractor's response, and so the plaintext extractor cannot tailor its response in the same way.
Theorem 2. Let (G, E, D) be a simulatable encryption algorithm. If (G, E, D) is PA1+ then it is PA2.
Proof This proof works in several stages. We wish to show that for any PA2 ciphertext creator for the encryption scheme A, there exists a plaintext extractor A * . First we show that any PA2 ciphertext creator A for the encryption scheme can be used to create a PA1+ ciphertext creatorĀ. Since the encryption scheme is PA1+ plaintext aware, there exist a plaintext extractorĀ * forĀ. We then show that we can use the plaintext extractorĀ * forĀ to build a plaintext extractor A * for A. We will use this technique liberally throughout this paper. Let A be any PA2 ciphertext creator and letĀ be the PA1+ ciphertext creator that runs as follows.
1. Execute A.
-If A makes a decryption oracle query, thenĀ passes this query directly on to its own decryption oracle. We now alter slightly the way that the randomness oracle works. Instead of randomly generated a block of randomness r and returning this toĀ, consider an oracle that randomly generates a block of randomness r ∈ {0, 1} l and returns f −1 (f (r)) to the ciphertext creator. Let W 3,Dist be the event that Dist(x) = 1 when the randomness oracle behaves in this way. Clearly, any significant difference between P r[W 2,Dist ] and P r[W 3,Dist ] can be used to create an algorithm that can distinguish between random blocks r and f −1 (f (r)), thus contravening the properties of f given in Definition 3. Hence,
If we examine the architecture now, we notice that RList contains elements of the form f −1 (f (r)), and A (being run as a subroutine ofĀ) is given elements of the form f (f −1 (f (r))) = f (r). Consider now a situation where -the randomness oracle returns f (r) instead of f −1 (f (r)) -to the ciphertext creator A (instead ofĀ), -and decryption queries are answered using a plaintext extractor A * . A * works by executingĀ * on the input (pk, C, R[A], RList), where C is the ciphertext to be decrypted and RList is the list of l-bit random blocks given by taking the responses C returned the randomness oracle and computing f −1 (C ). We may now consider the model in which the randomness oracle reverts to being an encryption oracle. I.e. instead of returning f (r) for some randomly chosen l-bit block r, it returns the encryption E(m, pk) for message m = P(aux ). Let W 5,Dist(x) be the event that Dist(x) = 1 in this model. As before, if there is any significant difference between P r[W 4 
is negligible as a function of the security parameter, and so that A has a successful plaintext extractor A * . Therefore, (G, E, D) is PA2 plaintext aware.
PA1+ Plaintext-Aware KEMs
It will be convenient for us to work with the hybrid version of the CramerShoup encryption scheme. In this section we will show that a KEM-DEM scheme composed of a PA1+ KEM and an arbitrary DEM is PA1+. We start by defining what we mean by a PA1+ KEM. The PA1+ model for a KEM is the obvious extension of the PA1+ model for an encryption scheme. Formally, we define the REAL game as:
1. The challenger generates a random key pair (pk, sk) = Gen(1 k ). 2. The attacker executes A on pk.
-If the attacker queries the randomness oracle, then the oracle generates a fixed-length random string r ∈ {0, 1} l uniformly at random and returns r to the attacker.
-If the attacker queries the decapsulation oracle with a ciphertext C, then the decapsulation oracle returns Decap(sk, C). The attacker terminates by outputting a bitstring x.
The FAKE game is defined as follows:
-If the attacker queries the randomness oracle, then the oracle generates a fixed-length random string r ∈ {0, 1} l uniformly at random, adds r to RList and returns r to the attacker. 
. It is easy to see that the system in which A interacts with its decryption oracle (in the REAL or FAKE game) is the same asĀ interacting with its decryption oracle in the same game. Hence, the outputs of A must be indistinguishable regardless of the game which A is playing.
The Cramer-Shoup Scheme
In this section we will show that the Cramer-Shoup scheme, when applied to fixed length messages, is fully plaintext aware (PA2). This will prove a conjecture of Bellare and Palacio [4] by showing PA2 schemes can exist in the standard model. For our purposes, the Cramer-Shoup scheme will consist of the CramerShoup KEM and an Encrypt-then-MAC DEM using a suitably secure encryption algorithm and MAC algorithm. Note that this is slightly different to the CramerShoup scheme proven PA1 plaintext aware by Bellare and Palacio [4] , but that similar techniques could have been used to prove that this scheme is PA1. We will define the Cramer-Shoup KEM as working over an arbitrary group G: this will make it easier to separate the properties required from the scheme from those that are required from the group.
